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FOREWORD:
THE PUZZLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
FRANK B. CROSS* AND JONATHAN BAERT WIENER**
How did we get environmental law?  The major theories of poli-
tics seem unable to explain this dramatic development in American
law.  Public choice theory predicts that special interest groups will
systematically out-organize the general public and that general inter-
est legislation will fail to overcome special interest opposition.1  Yet
the emergence of environmental law appears to contradict the public
choice hypothesis: it appears to represent the victory of the broad
general interest in clean air and water over the powerful special in-
terests of regulated industry.2
* Herbert D. Kelleher Professor of Business Law, University of Texas; Visiting Profes-
sor of Law, Duke University, 1998.  The text of this article is also available on the World-Wide
Web at <http://law.duke.edu/journals/9DELPFCross>.
** Associate Professor, Law School and Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke Uni-
versity; Director, Cummings Colloquia on Environmental Law.  I am very grateful to Julie Co-
vach of the Duke Law School Office of External Relations and to the 1997-98 Cummings Fel-
lows in Environmental Law—Laura Ford 98, Lisa Glover 99, and Robert Phocas ‘98—for
their invaluable assistance in running the Third Annual Cummings Colloquium on Environ-
mental Law held in March 1998.  I am also deeply grateful to Professor Christopher Schroeder
and the Duke Center for the Study of the Congress for co-sponsoring the Colloquium and for
infusing it with enormous intellectual and personal alacrity.  And I give many, many thanks to
Paul Portney for gracing the Colloquium with his sage remarks, and to Frank Cross for visiting
with us at Duke and bringing his keen insight to these issues of public choice and environ-
mental law.
1. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).  Professor Olson was to have been the keynote speaker
at this Colloquium, but he suddenly and tragically died shortly before the event.  We are all
indebted to Professor Olson’s foundational work and greatly saddened at his untimely passing.
Dr. Paul Portney of Resources for the Future, who had already agreed to be a participant in the
Colloquium, generously stepped in on short notice to deliver the keynote address.
2. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 59, 60 (1992) (“The Olson paradigm appears to have a straightforward implication for
2 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:1
Perhaps public choice theory, initially developed in the mid-
1960s, cannot account for the post-1968 change in American politics
that gave birth to modern environmental law.3 If so, what alternative
theory can explain this history?  Or perhaps environmental law really
is the product of special interests—of intra-industry gambits to im-
pose burdens on rival industry members.4 If so, is actual environ-
mental law doomed to neglect the public interest in a cleaner envi-
ronment?  And what can be done to improve the political system that
produces environmental law?
The Third Cummings Colloquium on Environmental Law at
Duke University was an effort to pull apart and piece back together
the puzzle of environmental politics.  As in past iterations of the
Cummings Colloquia, our mission was simple but ambitious: to bring
together diverse disciplines to confront the most difficult intellectual
and practical challenges in environmental law and policy.5
                                                                                                                                     
environmental legislation: there should not be any. . . .  [T]he two basic predictions [of Olson’s
model] are that environmental groups will not organize effectively and that environmental
statutes will not be passed.”); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Envi-
ronmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 542, 561 (1997) (“[I]t is
difficult to explain, in public choice terms, why there would be any environmental regulation at
all.”).
3. For example, Richard Posner’s 1974 article on the politics of regulation expressly dis-
tinguished social regulation as a phenomenon unexplained by the 1960s theories of economic
regulation.  See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 325, 355 (1974).  See also E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985) (finding
environmental regulation largely unexplained by standard theories).
4. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL / DIRTY
AIR (1981) (scrubber requirements in 1977 Clean Air Act protected eastern coal at the expense
of western coal); Ann P. Bartel & Lacy Glenn Thomas, Predation through Regulation: The
Wage and Profit Effects of the OSHA and the EPA, 30 J. LAW & ECON. 239 (1987) (OSHA and
EPA regulations protect large firms and rust-belt firms against smaller firms and sun-belt
firms); Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being Protected? 23
ECON. INQUIRY 551 (1985) (“prevention of significant deterioration” (PSD) provision in 1977
Clean Air Act was adopted by rustbelt  states over dissenting votes of sunbelt states in order to
suppress economic growth in, and industry relocation to, the sunbelt).
5. The Cummings Colloquia on Environmental Law at Duke University were launched
in 1996 by a generous gift in honor of Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., and by the leadership of Dean
Norman L. Christensen of Duke’s Nicholas School of the Environment and Dean Pamela B.
Gann of Duke Law School.  The First Cummings Colloquium, held in April 1996, addressed the
challenge posed to environmental law by the “new ecology”: the rejection by ecologists of the
static “balance of nature” equilibrium paradigm, and its replacement with a new non-
equilibrium paradigm in which nature is seen as perpetually in flux.  See Symposium, Beyond
the Balance of Nature: Environmental Law Faces the New Ecology, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 1 (1996).  The Second Cummings Colloquium, held in November 1996, addressed how di-
verse risks should be compared, how our methods of comparative risk analysis can be im-
proved, and how a democratic system of government should engage in setting priorities when
there is deep disagreement between experts and the voting public about the basic criteria on
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One difficulty with much past analysis of the issue has been the
conflation of the descriptive and normative issues raised by public
choice theory.  Devotees of the theory typically contend descriptively
that special interests drive legislation and then slip too easily into the
normative position that such legislation must be a bad thing, ad-
vancing special interests at the expense of the public good.6  Critics of
the theory, conversely, begin by presuming that environmental legis-
lation is patently a good thing and argue that it therefore could not
have been the product of inappropriate special interest influence—
and must instead have arisen from other sources, such as epochal
“republican moments.”7 But these are not the only options.  Another
possibility is that environmental legislation is the product of special
interests and that it may still be a good thing.8  Still another possibil-
ity is that environmental law may not be the product of special inter-
ests, and yet that it may be a bad thing.9
This Colloquium endeavored to keep the “is” and the “ought”
distinct.  First, we investigated the descriptive explanation of the
emergence of environmental law, remaining agnostic about our nor-
mative judgment of the results.  Second, we asked whether norma-
tively desirable environmental law requires fundamental reform of
the political system.
I. CAN SELF-INTERESTED DECISIONS EXPLAIN ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION?
The first set of articles in this symposium collection discusses
whether the public choice theory of self-interested decision-making
can explain the emergence of environmental legislation.  While the
articles agree that rational self-interest has played some role in this
legislation, they disagree over the nature of that interest and the de-
gree of its explanatory power.
                                                                                                                                     
which risks should be compared.  See Symposium, Risk in the Republic: Comparative Risk
Analysis and Public Policy, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (1997).
6. See generally Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law Environmentalism, 94
PUBLIC CHOICE 49 (1998); Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Environmental Politics Without
Romance, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S.
Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
7. See Farber, supra note 2.
8. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983); Donald Wittman, Why Democracies Produce
Efficient Results, 97 J. OF  POL. ECON. 1395 (1989).
9. See generally  Frank B. Cross, The Subtle Vices Behind Environmental Values, 8 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 151 (1997) (noting the regressive distributional effects of some environ-
mental regulation).
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Christopher Schroeder’s article seeks to rescue rational choice
theory from the critics’ claims that environmental law disproves its
predictions.  He tries to explain how these laws could be the product
of individual rational self interest on the part of voters and legisla-
tors, rather than some “republican moment” of public-interested
good government.  Yet his is not the gloomy public choice world of
rule by narrow special interests.  It is a much more optimistic vision
of widespread unorganized but rational voting in favor of environ-
mental protection.  In his model, the difficulties of large group col-
laboration are overcome by myriad individual self-interested votes
and by the opportunism of political entrepreneurs.  Schroeder also
points out the common underpinnings of the public choice and re-
publican moment theories: the public choice theorists need a set of
exogenous preferences to plug into their models of rational behavior,
and civic republicanism supplies one possible story of such prefer-
ence-formation; meanwhile, because civic republican moments still
depend on voting and political institutions to make an impact, the re-
publican moments must themselves be processed through the ma-
chinery of public choice.  Schroeder’s creative synthesis offers a fresh
reconciliation of the heretofore juxtaposed and individually inade-
quate theories of the politics of environmental law.
Donald Hornstein’s response to Schroeder does not entirely re-
ject the rational choice explanation of environmental legislation but
contends that it is incomplete.  He suggests that the motivations be-
hind environmental organizations are not so much the self-interest of
individual members as what he considers their altruistic republican
concern for the common good.  Voting for environmental protection
may similarly be explained, Hornstein contends, by altruistic rather
than self-interested ends.  Thus, Hornstein believes that environ-
mental legislation is not centrally explicable through self-interest.
R. Shep Melnick offers an argument by which the views of
Schroeder and Hornstein might be synthesized, though neither would
probably embrace his synthesis.  He explains how environmental
groups can form and assume considerable political power through
“purposive incentives.”  The classical public choice analysis views in-
dustry groups as the true special interests and seeks to explain why
they would create environmental laws that are conventionally
thought to be contrary to their interests (but in reality might serve
their efforts to burden rivals).  Melnick suggests that the “special in-
terests” driving environmental law are really environmental groups,
whose ability to organize and influence has been underestimated by
most past analyses.  Melnick’s environmental groups are not moti-
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vated by altruism, but rather by a desire to advance their policy ob-
jectives through power-seeking.
All three papers are interesting, but none is completely explana-
tory.  Schroeder’s theory of rational voting may offer a better expla-
nation of the initial “modern” environmental laws than has yet been
articulated.  But it may not, as Hornstein observes, fully account for
some subsequent environmental laws.  Hornstein’s theory of pub-
lic-spirited altruism may explain these other laws, but his theory fails
to explain how such altruism arises, why it often disappears, and how
it is channeled to one law rather than another.  Melnick’s theory of
powerful environmental groups has some plausibility today, but can-
not explain the important first generation of environmental legisla-
tion, which predates many of these groups—and which is the main
focus of Schroeder’s article.  Among other things, these papers dem-
onstrate both the difficulty of creating a single descriptive theory for
environmental legislation, and the fertile field offered by environ-
mental law for testing hypotheses about political dynamics.
II.  CAN REFORM IMPROVE THE PROCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATING?
A second set of articles addresses the opportunities for legisla-
tive reform, given the existence of special interest pressures.  Robert
Percival argues that reform can be produced by prominent “trigger
events” that motivate the general public to rise up and demand ac-
tion.  Rena Steinzor’s paper argues that the legislation created by
such trigger events may prove unwise, due to unanticipated conse-
quences.  Studying the Superfund law, she notes that its broad liabil-
ity provisions were counterproductive and the battle of special inter-
ests precluded the legislature from fixing this problem through
amendment.  Marc Landy and Kyle Dell’s paper shows how public
choice analysis can be oversold.  Even when the “special interests”
are lined up behind a reform proposal, Landy and Dell describe how
its prospects can be doomed by the combination of public perception
and coincidental electoral happenings.
If special interests do dominate the politics of environmental
law, then perhaps “better” environmental law requires not techno-
cratic reforms (such as requirements to employ precautionary princi-
ples or cost-benefit analysis) but fundamental reform of legislative
politics.  In short, better environmental law may require a better
Congress.
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This was the topic of an open discussion session at the end of the
Colloquium.  To set the stage, Professor Wiener played Candide to
Professor Munger’s Dr. Pangloss.  Candide labored under the im-
pression that hard work and a sturdy spirit could overcome all prob-
lems.  So too, economists at least since Pigou have been warning that
market actors will have incentives to create problems for third parties
(externalities), and have been urging government to force market ac-
tors to internalize these market externalities.  Meanwhile, Mancur
Olson and others have been warning that the same incentives to ex-
ternalize costs that are evident in market transactions are also ram-
pant in government activities.
So what can be done?  Professor Wiener offered a “naive” set of
reforms that Candide might have proposed were he a modern politi-
cal economist.  They included campaign finance reform; improving
the analytic capacity of the Congress to make regulatory decisions;
delegating the inherently analytic tasks of risk regulation to the Ex-
ecutive Branch or even to an apolitical expert commission like the
Federal Reserve; integrating Congressional committees into a single
Risk Committee empowered to prevent perverse cross-media shifts
of pollution; redrawing the political boundaries of environmental
regulation along ecosystem lines; extending term lengths to capture
more of the long-term impact of environmental issues and reduce the
creation of intertemporal externalities; and reducing transaction costs
of political voice so that more of the general public can participate—
or (more radically) returning to direct democracy through referenda
and interactive telecommunications technology.
The point of sketching these reform options was not to prove
their merit.  Many of them are obviously undesirable.  The point was
to ask: if we do face significant political market failures, can we de-
vise any intelligent reforms?
While the difficulty of reform is typically lamented, Michael
Munger’s paper argues that this difficulty is actually a good thing.
While reform is unlikely, in his view, due to organized interests, he
argues that it will be bad when it does occur.  Munger argues that the
world we inhabit is, inescapably, the best of all possible worlds.  Yet
unlike Dr. Pangloss, his view is not particularly optimistic; he defends
the dismal status quo only by reference to the comparative inferiority
of the alternative.
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III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The contrasting presentations at this year’s Colloquium certainly
illustrate the difficulties of public choice analysis as applied to envi-
ronmental regulation.  While it would be presumptuous to expect a
resolution of the issues, the papers shed considerable light on the de-
bate.  The colloquy between Schroeder and Hornstein, for example,
illustrates the most insightful debate we have seen on the otherwise
inexplicable success of the path-breaking environmental laws enacted
between 1969 and 1973.
Yet this illumination may lead to complication and uncertainty
rather than resolution.  For example, the bulk of public choice schol-
arship presumes that industry groups or regions or some other entity
seeking profit or economic protection are the special interests that
distort the law.  Yet Melnick contends that it is the environmental
groups who are the powerful special interests.  Other papers likewise
testify to the influence of these groups.  Creating and applying a the-
ory of special interest influence is obviously difficult if we cannot
even agree on who the special interests are, or what their objective
functions are.  What do environmental groups maximize?
All of the papers explicitly or implicitly concede that interest
group theory has some explanatory power for environmental regula-
tion but that it cannot entirely explain such action.  Perhaps it is a
fool’s errand to seek a simple and yet thickly rational explanation of
the emergence of environmental law.10  Rather, future study might be
better directed toward how special interests interact and compromise
with other influences on government.  The interaction clearly differs
over time and space.  Both those who accept and those who reject
public choice explanations of government have the same daunting
task of explaining why and how environmental law has developed as
it has, with its considerable general benefits and yet its unfortunate
distortions, inefficiencies and adverse side effects.
10. For further discussion of the difficulties of these and other theories of the advent of
environmental law, see Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environ-
mental Regulation, 87 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming Feb. 1999).
